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Abstract: A large body of evidence suggests that identity-derived political affiliation is increasingly driving
environmental preferences. We consider a variation on the reverse question: under what conditions might
issue preferences change voters’ party choice? Academic literature predicts that voters are most likely to
change their party affiliation when: (1) a party’s platform is distinct and transparent; and (2) the issue is
important and personally salient. We argue that the explicitly anti-environmental campaign message of Donald
Trump in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election fulfills the first condition; for the second condition, we exploit the
plausibly exogenous spatial variation in EPA Superfund sites to generate a source of exogenous variation in the
personal saliency of environmental issues. Our empirical analysis, conducted at both the individual- and county-
level, presents evidence on the relationship between Superfund and environmental preferences, establishes a
robust causal link from Superfund to voter behaviour, and finally explores the possibility of heterogeneous
effects via differing issue salience by age and/or income cohort. We find robust evidence that the presence
of a nearby Superfund site did indeed reduce the number of votes for Trump. Specifically, our results imply
that almost 490,000 voters that would have otherwise voted for Trump changed their Party vote choice based
on their Superfund-induced environmental preferences in the 2016 election. Furthermore, we find evidence of
hetergeneous effects of Superfund on voting behavior associated with household income, but not with voter age
cohort. In particular, we find that the effect of Superfund on support for Trump grows as household income
increases from well below the poverty line to moderately low levels of around $30,000-$40,000, and then tapers
off or declines. Significantly, these moderately low-income voters are precisely the income group that are also
most likely to vote for Trump, suggesting that educational campaigns aimed at lower-income households to
increase personal saliency of environmental issues could potentially have disproportionately large political
effects.
Key words: Environmental voting, issue preference, party affiliation, post-materialism, environmental Kuznets
curve, Trump
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21 Introduction
Under what conditions might environmental preferences change voters’ choice across party platforms? The
question is an important one, for even as complex environmental problems increasingly demand coordinated
political solutions, evidence suggests that for more and more voters, identity-derived (initial) political affiliation
is more likely to drive issue preferences than the reverse. This paper takes advantage of the unique nature of
the Trump candidacy in the 2016 US Presidential election to explore the conditions under which voters might
change their party choice based on environmental preferences. In particular, political scientists have theorized
that voters are more likely to change their party affiliation based on issue preferences when both the issue
position of a party is clear, and when the issue is not only important to the voter but also personally salient (see,
for example, Carsey and Layman, 2006; Ansolabehere and Puy, 2018). Although party vote choice for a single
election does not necessarily imply a change in party affiliation - e.g. a deeper, more long-term association
with a party - the two concepts are related, and changing party vote choice is likely to be one of the first steps
to changing party affiliation. We argue that the 2016 election fulfills the first condition; the Trump campaign
message of unambiguous, active antipathy towards environmental initiatives was unique in modern American
political history - he promised not only to ‘cancel’ the Paris climate agreement, but also to ‘end the war on
coal’, and suggested that concerns about climate change were a hoax (Bomberg, 2017).
Given the unique and unambiguous environmental position of Trump’s campaign, the second condition
suggested for a political shift in response to a partisan issue position is that voters must find the issue, in
this case the environment, to be not only important but also personally salient. However, to isolate a causal
channel from issue to political preferences we require a source of exogenous variation in issue salience. In the
case of concern for the environment, we argue that, conditional on voting patterns from the 2012 Presidential
election and a host of socio-economic and demographic features, the spatial distribution of US Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)-designated toxic environmental hazards, or so-called ‘Superfund’ sites, provides just
such a source of exogenous variation in environmental preferences.
Established by Congress in 1980 under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA), the Superfund program provides funds and authority to the EPA to identify and clean
up (or force responsible parties to clean up; see Sigman, 2001) contaminated sites that pose a danger to human
health and/or the environment. This includes hazardous waste sites associated with manufacturing facilities,
processing plants, landfills and mining sites. In addition to protecting human health and the environment by
cleaning up polluted sites, Superfund has a mandate to engage in dialogue and collaborate with local commu-
nities, with the goal of advocating and strengthening ‘early and meaningful community participation’ during
clean-ups. The existence of a Superfund site thus generates significant local awareness of the potential danger
to human health of environmental contamination, as well as highlighting the government’s role in cleaning up
pollution, remedial action, and environmental protection.
One threat to identification in this framework is that the unconditional variation in the location of Super-
fund sites could be jointly determined with the pattern of political affiliation, as represented in party voting
preferences, across counties. For example, counties with either more or fewer Republicans may be more or
less likely to identify Superfund sites, perhaps because of associated variation in local environmental laws and
enforcement (Wu and Cutter, 2011; Liu et al., 2014; Holian and Kahn, 2015; Booth, 2017). Thus, to control
for baseline political preferences (including any party-orientation that was jointly determined with Superfund
location), we condition the analysis on information about the 2012 Presidential vote. Information on the Re-
publican vote (of a county or an individual) associated with the 2012 election controls for all observed and
unobserved political characteristics (of a county or an individual) that determined the partisan voting pattern
in 2012, including any partisan attributes that might be associated with Superfund. In addition, we control for
both individual and county-level variables (as appropriate) that could be correlated both with Superfund sites
and voters’ attitudes to the environment, e.g. income, age, gender, race and education level, county population,
and poverty rate.
At the individual level, we find robust evidence of a positive association between the presence of nearby
Superfund sites and a high level of concern for the environment, and we show that this relationship is not driven
3by unobservable confounding variation in party preferences. We then analyze whether exogenous variation
in voters’ concern for, and personal experience of, environmental quality via the presence of Superfund sites
lowers expected support for Trump in the 2016 election. This proposition is tested at both the individual-
and county-level and we find clear evidence consistent with theory: conditional on information from the 2012
Presidential election as well as our set of socio-economic and demographic controls, voters in counties with
Superfund sites are statistically significantly less likely to vote for Trump than those in comparable counties
without Superfund sites. Specifically, our results imply that almost 490,000 voters that would have otherwise
voted for Trump changed their party vote based on their environmental preferences in the 2016 election.
Having established a baseline average treatment effect, we then consider what types of voters may be more
or less likely to find an exposure to environmental issues to be sufficiently personally salient to lead to a change
in voting behaviour. In other words, we investigate whether there may be heterogeneous treatment effects.
We find three relevant academic literatures that speak to the possibility of heterogeneous effects of Superfund
on issue salience, in particular, with respect to age and income: the literature on the so-called ‘environmental
Kuznets curve’ (EKC) (e.g. Shafik, 1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Carson, 2018); the literature on post-
materialism (e.g. Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987; Booth, 2017); and, the literature on environmental voting (e.g.
Kahn and Matsuaka, 1997; Holian and Kahn, 2015). All three literatures suggest that the personal saliency of
environmental issues across individuals within countries may be a function of income, but that the shape of any
relationship is ex ante theoretically ambiguous and hence, is an empirical question. While neither the EKC nor
the environmental voting literatures make unambiguous predictions about the effect of age, the post-materialism
literature predicts that younger voters may be more strongly effected by exposure to Superfund.
We test for heterogenous effects of age and income by including interactions with these variables and Super-
fund in both the individual- and county-level analyses. Although we find no evidence of heterogeneous effects
of Superfund on voting behavior associated with voter age cohort, we do find a modest effect of household
income. In particular, we find that the effect of Superfund on support for Trump grows as household income
increases from well below the poverty line to moderately low levels of around $30,000-$40,000, and then ta-
pers off. Significantly, these moderately low-income voters are precisely the income group that are also most
likely to vote for Trump, suggesting that educational campaigns aimed at lower-income households to increase
personal saliency of environmental issues could potentially have disproportionately large political effects.
Our analysis is the first, to our knowledge, to rigorously test the extent to which the personal salience
of environmental issues causally leads to a switch in voters’ party choice. Voters’ environmental saliency in
Superfund counties has always been higher than in non-Superfund counties, but prior to 2016, when the two
main Parties’ environmental policy platforms were less distinctive, this made little difference to voting patterns.
The clear dichotomy in Party platforms in the 2016 election is what makes the Trump candidacy a useful ‘natural
experiment’ for testing the hypothesis that it takes both a difference in the parties’ platforms and personal voter
issue salience to effect a change in voter behaviour. Superfund generates exogenous variation in the latter
while Trump’s environmental policy platform generates exogenous variation in the former. Whether, as theory
predicts, the combination of issue salience and a distinctive party platform eventually leads to changes in deeper
party affiliation is another question, but we argue that changing voter choice in a major National election must
surely be one of the first steps. The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 reviews the political and economic
literature on the relationship between issue preference, party affiliation, and environmental policy. Section 3
describes the data and method, section 4 discusses the empirical results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Issue preferences, party affiliation, voter behavior, and environmental policy
The Trump campaign’s message of active antipathy towards environmental protection was unique in modern
American political history. Hejny (2018) emphasizes the Trump administration’s explicit opposition to Presi-
dent Obama’s environmental policies, and points out what a far cry this situation was from the more bipartisan
environmental cooperation of the past. In fact, in 2016 the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) reported the
largest voting gap between Republican and Democrat members’ of congress environmental records since they
4began keeping track in 1970 (Hejny, 2018). Daniels et al. (2012) also notes that the environment was a relatively
non-partisan issue in the early 1970s, and in the 1980s and 1990s party affiliation was not closely tied to envi-
ronmental preferences. For example, Davis et al. (2008) point out that in the 1988 election, Republican George
Bush promised to be the ‘environmental President’ and even attacked his Democratic opponent’s environmen-
tal record, and many pro-environmental supporters of Bill Clinton in that race were later disappointed with his
policy record on the issue. Hejny (2018) documents a rapid shift between the Republican Party’s environmental
policy platform in 2012 compared to that in 2016, when it stopped promoting environmental protection alto-
gether and extended the conservative critique to the ‘environmental administrative state,’ specifically targeting
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Consistent with the relative similarities in environmental messaging between previous Party platforms,
most research on voter behavior finds that prior to 2016 the environment rarely figured as a major voting is-
sue. Guber (2001) finds that environmental attitudes had very little impact on individual voting preferences.
Leiserowitz (2006) notes that Americans regarded both the environment and climate change as relatively low
national priorities, while Repetto (2006) and Hallam and Coffey (2007) also find that environmental preferences
had little impact on Presidential voting. Although partisan polarization of public opinion has increased for en-
vironmental policy over the past two decades, along with many other social and economic issues (Guber, 2013;
McCright et al., 2014; Eun Kim and Urpelainen, 2018), as recently as 2010 Gallup polls found that majorities
of both Democrats (74%) and Republicans (51%) indicated they were sympathetic to the environmental move-
ment (Daniels et al., 2012). Eun Kim and Urpelainen (2018) find that even among self-identified Republicans,
pro-environmental attitudes and support for spending on environmental initiatives have, on average, stayed
more-or-less constant between 1973 and 2012. Where a role for environmental attitudes has been found in
prior electoral outcomes, the effect is reported as being relatively small in magnitude (Davis and Wurth, 2003;
Davis et al., 2008). Indeed, List and Sturm (2006) specifically choose environmental policy as a canonical
example of a ’secondary issue’ that is widely believed not be a major determinant of voting outcomes.
More recently a number of scholars have argued that in fact the direction of causality between issue prefer-
ence and party affiliation is increasingly running in the other direction, so that party identification has become
a significant predictor of beliefs and attitudes towards the environment, rather than the reverse (e.g. Daniels
et al., 2012; Guber, 2013; Ansolabehere and Puy, 2018). This perspective emerges from an ongoing, broader
and more fundamental debate among political scientists concerning whether party affiliation drives issue pref-
erences, or issue preferences drive party affiliation. The first perspective, commonly refered to as the ‘Michigan
model’, is that political party identification is deeply related to social identity and determined by (mostly exoge-
nous) demographic, cultural and psychological characteristics that are fixed over time, and as such it is largely
party affiliation itself that shapes voters’ political attitudes (e.g. Green et al., 2002; Bartels, 2002). For example,
Carsey and Layman (2006) analyze U.S. voter survey data from the National Election Study (NES) on three
major policy issues: government spending, welfare for minorities, and abortion. They find that voters who
are aware of party differences on an issue, but who do not find that issue to be personally important, do tend
to change their personal views on the issue to accommodate the position associated with their party affiliation
(with Republicans being more likely than Democrats to convert to more conservative views). Furthermore,
for this group of voters none of their personal attitudes on the issues had a statistically significantly effect on
changing party identification, a result consistent with the Michigan model.
On the other hand, the opposing hypothesis is that party affiliation emerges and adapts endogenously to
voter’s political attitudes, thus representing a ‘running tally’ of political preferences that may evolve over time
(e.g. Achen, 1992; Gerber and Green, 1998). Of course, either or both directions of causality could be op-
erational under different circumstances, so a natural question arises as to the conditions under which voters
may change their party affiliation. Notably, scholars who have looked closely at this question have emphasized
the importance of issue salience as a prerequisite condition. For example, in their study of Canadian federal
elections in 1997 and 2000, Blanger and Meguid (2002) argue that a party’s competence on an issue does not
influence voter behavior unless the issue is considered personally important. Carsey and Layman (2006) also
find that U.S. voters who are aware of party differences on an issue and who also find the issue to be personally
salient are more likely to change their party affiliation based on their issue attitudes. Conclude the authors:
5We contend that partisanship and issue attitudes both cause changes in the other. However, the
degree to which each orientation exerts a causal influence varies systematically as a function of
the importance individuals attach to an issue and the degree to which they are aware of partisan
differences on the issue...
[W]e argue that both party-based issue change and issue-based party change among individuals
likely occurs, particularly on issues that clearly divide the parties. When party leaders, candidates,
and platforms take distinct stands on these issues, it signals to citizens which views on these issues
go with each party. This creates pressure for citizens to bring their party identification and views
on these issues closer together. Some citizens will do so by altering their party affiliations, while
others may move their issue positions closer to the stands of their party’s leaders and platforms.
The key theoretical question is who should change their party identifications and who should
change their issue preferences? The answer rests on two individual level factors: awareness of
party differences on the issue and the salience of that issue. (p. 472)
The political science literature described above predicts two pre-requisite conditions for voters to change
their party choice based on environmental preferences: voters must be aware of a clear partisan difference on
environmental issues, and they must find environmental issues to be personally salient. However, this latter
condition then begs the question of what kind of voter might be more likely to find environmental issues
personally salient? In other words, when confronted with an environmental fact or experience (such as the
presence of a Superfund site), are there heterogeneous treatment effects on the degree of saliency that might
translate into heterogeneous effects on voting behavior? We identify three relevant - and distinct - literatures,
which either directly or indirectly provide a theoretical framework to address this question.
First, empirical work on the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) has shown that at the national level,
higher aggregate incomes have a non-linear relationship with some measures of pollution, with environmental
quality initially falling as income increases from a low base, before levelling and eventually even improving in
some cases as income rises (e.g. Shafik, 1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1995). One possible mechanism through
which this relationship could operate has been hypothesized to be greater preferences for a cleaner environment
relative to economic growth in wealthier countries (e.g. Carson, 2018). Within richer countries such as the U.S.
it is not clear whether increased household and/or county-level income might translate into stronger preferences
for environmental policy, but there are several possible channels through which it could play a role. On one
hand, lower-income households may find environmental regulation to be more personally salient if, for example,
they lack the resources to adapt to environmental hazards (e.g. Shafik, 1994). On the other hand, analogously
with cross-country studies, the marginal utility of further consumption relative to environmental goods may
be lower in higher income individuals, further increasing their preferences for environmental protection (e.g.
Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Stern, 2017; Carson, 2018). In addition, higher income households may also
be more highly educated and thus more aware of environmental issues (e.g. Inglehart, 1995; Holian and Kahn,
2015).
The idea that higher-income individuals might display stronger preferences for non-material goods due to
the diminishing marginal utility of consumption is mirrored in the post-materialism literature as well, although
the focus tends to be on changes in the degree of scarcity at the aggregate level rather than on differences
between individuals within a given cohort. For example, using slightly different terminology, Inglehart and
Flanagan (1987) explain: “Economic factors tend to play a decisive role under conditions of economic scarcity;
but as scarcity diminishes, other factors shape society to an increasing degree... a principle that might be called
the diminishing marginal utility of economic determinism.” In other words, Inglehart and Flanagan (1987)
argue that as countries get richer and more secure, people tend to vote more on the basis of post-materialist
values, such as those related to the environment, rather than materialist values that emphasize a stable economy
and rising real incomes. The evidence for this theory tends to focus on patterns across countries of differing
levels of development; empirical support is weaker when evaluating environmental concern across individuals
within countries at the national level (e.g. Dunlap and Mertig, 1997; Brechin, 1999; Dunlap and York, 2008;
Fairbrother, 2013), although there is some evidence that environmental preferences may first emerge among in-
dividuals of higher socioeconomic status before ‘trickling down’, particularly in richer countries where concern
6for the environment is long established (e.g. Pampel and Hunter, 2012; Nawrotzki and Pampel, 2013). Empir-
ical support is stronger for the presence of an ‘age cohort’ effect that suggests that younger generations will
be more oriented towards post-materialist values than their predecessors, at least as long as improvements in
personal and economic security have occurred over time (e.g. Booth, 2017). Indeed, in the U.S., both Liu et al.
(2014) and Booth (2017) show that individual income only weakly predicts environmental concerns, certainly
in contrast to political ideology. The latter study also finds that, consistent with theory, younger people express
greater environmental concerns and are more post-materialist than older people.
How such concerns might translate into voting preferences, and hence, into a revealed demand for environ-
mental regulation, is the focus of research on voting patterns associated with environmental propositions, with
the demand for environmental regulation typically estimated using aggregated data on binding voting referenda.
Theoretically, the demand for environmentally favourable initiatives may depend on both income directly, as
well as a number of factors indirectly related to income (and each other) such as spatial location, education,
and political affiliation; theory is thus sufficiently ambiguous as to make this an empirical question. While ear-
lier analyses undertaken at the aggregate (county-) level found a positive relationship between mean household
income and support for environmental referenda (e.g. Deacon and Shapiro, 1975), other studies at the census
tract and lower levels of aggregation have found the reverse. In particular, Kahn and Matsuaka (1997) find
a concave relationship between voting for environmental goods and income such that, at any given point in
time, richer households exhibit less support for environmental regulation than poorer households. Kahn (2002)
suggests that across census tracts, wealthier voters are more likely to perceive that environmental regulation
represents a form of redistribution and are less likely to exhibit support for California’s environmental ballots.
Wu and Cutter (2011) also find that areas with a relatively high number of poor households show the most
support for environmental propositions, although throughout the income distribution the relationship overall
is nonlinear, with middle-income households showing the lowest level of support, and higher income house-
holds showing slightly more support than middle-income, but still less than the lowest income group. However,
Kahn (2002) notes that it is possible to be simultaneously ‘anti-environmental regulation’, e.g. due to being
anti-redistribution, and ‘pro-environment’ at the same time. In some studies, age cohort also plays a role, al-
though again the sign of the relationship is unclear; consistent with the post-materialism literature, Wu and
Cutter (2011) find that younger people show more support than older people for environmental regulations,
while on the other hand, Kahn (2002) documents a positive relationship between environmental support and
the proportion of people aged 65 and above.
Taken together, then, the political science literature predicts that voters who find environmental issues
to be personally salient are those most likely to change their party affiliation based on their environmental
preferences. While (long-run) party affiliation and (short-run) party vote choice are distinct concepts, they are
nevertheless related, with the latter surely a precursor of the former. Thus, we investigate voter behavior in
the 2016 Presidential election with an eye to estimating how many voters changed their party choice based on
environmental preferences. We hypothesize further that this effect may be heterogeneous, in that the degree to
which Superfund exposure makes environmental issues more personally salient may vary across individuals by
both age and income, although the sign of the relationship of salience with each these characteristics is ex ante
theoretically ambiguous. In the remainder of this paper we exploit the unique anti-environmental campaign
of Donald Trump and the conditionally exogenous distribution of Superfund sites to empirically explore these
hypotheses.
3 Data and Method
The data used for our analysis come from a variety of sources at the individual and county level. Our key
independent variable of interest is the presence of a Superfund site in a county. The process by which a location
is included on the Superfund list starts when a potentially hazardous site is reported to the EPA by Federal, State,
local authorities, or individuals. If a preliminary evaluation determines that the site poses a threat to human
health and/or the environment, a more detailed inspection is performed and the potential danger associated
with the site is given a ‘Hazard Ranking System’ (HRS) score from 0 to 100. Sites with HRS scores over
728.5 are eligible for Appendix B of the National Contingency Plan, known as the ‘National Priorities List’
(NPL). Also, sites can be placed on the NPL list if they are designated as ‘top priority’ by local authorities if
there is significant threat to human health or if the EPA otherwise deems it more cost-effective to deal with the
contamination via the remedial NPL process rather than by other emergency measures. For most of the analysis,
we consider the full list of proposed, current, deleted, and SSA (Superfund Alternative Approach) Superfund
sites; each of these sites will have generated significant local attention to the particular environmental problem at
hand and brought attention to the government’s role in environmental clean-up. Among the sample of counties
for which we have Census Bureau data (see below) there are 704 sites on the full CERCLA list, which we label
‘Superfund’. As a robustness check we also present results using only a smaller subset of 560 sites on the NPL.
Data on Superfund sites were downloaded from the U.S. EPA’s Superfund website.
Data on the county-level 2016 and 2012 Presidential election results were downloaded from information
compiled from Townhall.com and the Guardian newspaper by Tony McGovern and made publicly available
on Github.com. Data on absolute numbers of voter registrations and turnouts come from the U.S. Election
Assistance Commission’s (EAC) 2016 Election Administration and Voting survey. We compute an estimate
of the 2016 voting age population of each county by first calculating the voting age proportion of the total
population in 2010 using the Census Bureau’s population age distribution in 2010, and then multiplying this
fraction by the total population in 2015. This estimated voting age population is then used in the denominator
to calculate county-level voter participation rates. Data on exposure to import competition come from Autor
et al. (2013) and is measured as the average growth in import exposure between the 1990-2000 sub-period and
the 2000-2007 sub-period in the commuting zone in which a county lies. Import exposure is measured as a
combination of pre-existing industrial structure and the increase in imports over the period see (see Autor et al.,
2013, 2016), and although import competition could come from any country, in practice the greatest increase
in this period is from China. Thus, we name this variable ‘China shock’.
County-level census data used in the analysis were collected for the most recent year available for each
variable in early March 2017 from the Census Bureau’s data portal. Census data come from a combination
of census data collected every ten years and are available for all counties. The Census Bureau’s American
Community (ACS) 3-year Survey is drawn from over 3.5 million randomly selected households across the
country ‘to provide communities with reliable and timely demographic, housing, social, and economic data’
(US Census Bureau ACS Guide). County-level total population, median household income, and poverty rates
are from 2015. County-level measures of population by age, and unemployment rate data are from 2010;
employment data are from 2009; urban share data are from 2000, and educational, labor force participation, and
household income shares are averaged over the period 2005-2009. Since the analysis is purely cross-sectional
we rely on the not unreasonable assumption that the relative values of control variables across counties will not
have shifted significantly, but to the extent that the cross-sectional distribution changed before 2016, this will
introduce some measurement error into the estimation.
Individual survey data comes from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCESS16), a high
quality matched random sample national survey of over 64,000 individuals that is publicly available online
(Ansolabehere and Schaner, 2017). We extract data related to concern for the environment, alongside data
related to individuals’ votes in the 2016 and 2012 Presidential elections, household income, age, gender, race,
and education level. Only voters who answered the post-election survey and who reside in a sample county
included in the county-level analyses are included, leaving us with a maximum sample of 29,515. Household
income in the CCESS16 survey is binned across 16 categories; we use the midpoint of each bin as the value of
household income. The average household income of the sample of individual voters is higher than the average
median household income of the counties (with a mean survey household income over $76,000 compared to
an average county median income of just under $50,000), but this is consistent with the relatively high income
inequality in the U.S.; we expect mean income to be higher than median income. The CCESS16 individuals also
voted in smaller numbers for Trump than our county figures, but again a direct comparison is difficult since the
aggregated county level statistics include many larger, less-populated counties with relatively high numbers of
Trump voters. The remaining demographics are fairly well matched between the datasets. Summary statistics
for all variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 1.
8The estimation strategy is very straightforward; for county-level analysis we model the county-level re-
publican vote percentage as a function of Republican candidate Mitt Romney’s share of the 2012 Presidential
vote, our measures of Superfund sites, and a variety of economic and demographic controls, clustering robust
standard errors at the state level.
(1) Trump%2016i = α+ β1Romney%2012i + β2Superfundi +X
′
i
Π+ µi,
Controlling for the 2012 Republican vote on the RHS of the regression is similar to modeling the excess
share won by Trump in 2016 over Romney in 2012, but with the advantage that we do not impose the ad
hoc constraint that the coefficient is 1 on the Romney 2012 share. The Romney variable essentially captures,
in one variable, all the county-level characteristics that determined the Republican vote in the 2012 election,
including attitudes towards the environment. Thus to the extent that differences across counties in partisan
voting behaviour (e.g. influenced by attitudes about the environment) has remained stable between 2012 and
2016, the inclusion of the Romney share variable should capture these, and only newly salient variables should
show up as statistically significant.
The dependent variables modeled using individual survey data are binary dummy variables, and these are
estimated using linear probability models:
(2) Responsei = α+X
′
i
Π+ µi,
The regression tables report coefficient estimates and their associated robust p-values in parentheses, indi-
cating statistical significance at the .001, .01 and .05 levels with asterisks as explained in the tables’ footnotes.
County-level regression cluster standard errors at the state level, and individual level regressions cluster stan-
dard errors at the county level. Some regression specifications restrict the estimation to a subset of data and/or
additionally control for state fixed effects, and this is noted both in the text and in the relevant tables.
4 Results
Our empirical analysis, conducted at both the individual- and county-level and informed by previous research in
the economics and political science literatures, follows a straightforward chain of argument by first presenting
evidence on the relationship between Superfund and environmental preferences, then establishing a robust
causal link from Superfund to voter behaviour, and finally exploring the possibility of heterogeneous effects of
Superfund on voting behavior, via differing issue salience by age and/or income cohort.
4.1 Superfund sites and environmental preferences
As discussed in section 1, a mandate of the Superfund program is community outreach, so we expect that
residents of counties with Superfund sites will be exposed to more news and information about environmental
hazards than those of counties without Superfund sites. For example, a search of the website of the local
newspaper in one (randomly chosen) county with a Superfund site, the Sun Chronicle of North Attleboro, MA
(population 43,500), turned up 256 articles that included the term ‘Superfund.’ On the other hand, a similar
search of the Cranston Herald, the local newspaper of Cranston RI (population 81,000), a nearby town just
over on the other side of Providence that does not have a Superfund site, turned up exactly zero such articles.
But does this heightened awareness of environmental hazards translate into greater concern for the envi-
ronment? We first investigate whether having one or more Superfund sites nearby raises voters’ concern about
the environment using responses in the CCES16 survey. In Table 2 column (1) we model the likelihood voters
indicate that the environment has ‘Very High Importance’ - MIP Environment - as a function of whether there
is a Superfund site, controlling for the log of household income, age cohort, gender, race and education level.
9We find that voters who live in counties with at least one Superfund site are more likely to indicate that the
environment is of very high importance, and this is highly statistically significant.
A possible concern with the results in column (1) is that counties with Superfund sites may differ in political
orientation from those without for unobservable reasons. Since research suggests that voters’ attitudes about the
environment are increasingly driven by their political affiliation (e.g. Liu et al., 2014; Booth, 2017), we may be
observing the results of their differing political orientation rather than the direct effect of a Superfund site. To
test for this possibility, in column (2), we control for whether the respondent voted for Mitt Romney in the 2012
Presidential election as a proxy for voter party affiliation. Clearly, to the extent that environmental attitudes
might drive political voter choice, the Romney variable is likely to be endogenous, and thus we interpret the
results in column (2) with care. We find that those respondents who voted for Romney in 2012 are much less
likely to consider the environment to be very important (with causality between these two variables uncertain).
However, the coefficient on Superfund remains positive and statistically significant even when controlling for
past voter behavior, suggesting that the significance of Superfund is likely not driven by unobservable omitted
variables correlated with political affiliation.
In column (3), we drop the (potentially endogenous) Romney variable but additionally control for some
county-level characteristics that could be correlated both with Superfund sites and with voters’ attitudes towards
the environment - specifically, county-level median income, poverty rate, urban share, and total population. The
Superfund variable remains positive and robustly statistically significant. Then, in column (4) we introduce
state fixed effects to control for unobservable characteristics that are common within - but differ across - states.
However, even with state fixed effects controlling for average differences in attitudes towards the environment
between states, we still find respondents in those counties with Superfund sites to be more likely to rate the
environment as very important than voters in the same state but in a county without a Superfund site.
In Table 2 column (5) we keep the county-level controls and state fixed effects but separate our dummy
for Superfund into ‘1 Superfund site’ and ‘2 or more Superfund sites’ and find that the effect is statistically
equivalent; the coefficient on each (0.029) is identical to that on our Superfund variable in column (4). Thus,
having one Superfund site is enough to raise the profile of environmental issues as personally salient, and more
sites do not increase this (at least to an extent that can be captured in the survey).
A lingering concern may be that, despite the extensive control set and the inclusion of the Romney variable,
there may still be unobservable county-level characteristics correlated with both political affiliation and the
location of Superfund sites. In addition, Ansolabehere and Puy (2018) discuss the potential emergence of
‘naive salience’ for issues that are located close together on the political spectrum. To check whether the
Superfund variable may be picking up either unobservable political tendencies or politically related issues, in
Table 3 columns (6)-(7) we reproduce regression specification (4) but use the responses of whether a voter
finds ‘Very Important’ other issues that may be correlated with attitudes towards the environment, namely
gun control and gay marriage. The coefficients on Superfund for both of these issues are very small and
not statistically significantly different from zero. In column (8), we do the same for a more ‘neutral’ issue,
government deficits, and again find no relationship with Superfund (similar null results were found for all other
issues; results available upon request from the authors). Finally, the CCESS16 survey also asked respondents
binary questions about whether or not they supported a series of described policies. In column (9), we model
whether or not respondents indicate support for the statement “Strengthen enforcement of the Clean Air Act
and Clean Water Act even if it costs US jobs”. In this case, we find that respondents in Superfund counties are
statistically significantly more likely to support such a policy compared to those in counties without Superfund
sites. Thus, overall we find convincing evidence that the presence of a Superfund site indeed increases concern
for the environment, and that this is not associated with other issue (politically associated) preferences unrelated
to the environment.
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4.2 Environmental preferences and voter behavior
Having established that voters who live in a county with a Superfund site find environmental issues to be more
personally salient than those that live in a county with no Superfund sites, we now turn to the question of
whether the presence of Superfund also lowers support for Trump. All together about a quarter of U.S. counties
have one or more Superfund sites. So, to address this question examine the distribution of Superfund sites
across the country, and see how this correlates with county-level support for Trump in the 2016 Presidential
election. In section 4.1, we provided evidence that the variation in Superfund is uncorrelated with traditionally
‘liberal’ political preferences other than those related to the environment. Nevertheless, to control for any
remaining background confounding variation in party affiliation, in all regressions we control for our proxy
for party affiliation - the percentage of the vote won by Mitt Romney in 2012 (for county-level analyses) or
whether a survey respondent voted for Romney (in the individual-level analyses).
In Table 4, we consider the relationship between the county-level vote for Trump and the presence of Super-
fund sites. In column (10), we observe that the presence of at least one Superfund site (our Superfund dummy
variable) is associated with a 2.4% lower vote excess share for Trump, i.e. controlling for the Republican share
of the vote in 2012. In column (11), we disaggregate this effect between counties with exactly one Superfund
site and those with two or more, finding that the effect on the Trump vote more than doubles from 1.4% to
3.9%. In column (12), we further discriminate between one, two to four, and five or more Superfund sites.
Again, we observe a strong ’dose-response’ pattern, with the reduction in expected Trump vote increasing from
1.4% to 3.4% to 5.8%.
The pattern found in Table 4 is striking: a statistically significant and meaningfully large effect on the
excess Trump vote share that increases as the number of Superfund sites increases. However, the presence of
Superfund sites could be correlated with other attributes associated more strongly with Trump than with the
previous Republican Presidential candidate, and this could create an omitted variable bias. Thus, in Table 5
we explore this possibility by additionally controlling for a host of additional characteristics that have been
associated with Trump voters. In column (13), we add county-level controls for median household income, the
poverty rate, the share of white, black, Hispanic and Asian people in the population, the total population, the
share that live in an urban area, and age distribution. Many of these variables are indeed statistically significant
and carry the expected sign. Their inclusion reduces the estimate on the Superfund dummy from -2.4% to
-1.1%, but it remains highly statistically significant. In column (14), we add more control variables related to
county-level economic characteristics, including the degree to which a county experienced growth in its import
exposure (a so-called ‘China shock’), the unemployment rate, male labor force participation rate, and the share
of manufacturing and mining in non-farm employment. The inclusion of the extra economic controls slightly
reduces the coefficient on Superfund, now to -1%, but again it remains highly statistically significant. Then,
in column (15) we additionally control for State fixed effects. In other words, we ask whether the observed
relationship between Trump vote and our Superfund dummy variable is observed across counties within states,
in effect controlling for all additional unobservable characteristics that are common across all counties within
a State. The regression with state fixed effects in column (15) explains nearly 97% of the variation in Trump
support across counties, and although the coefficient on the Superfund dummy is now reduced in magnitude to
-.6%, it nevertheless remains highly statistically significant.
The results from Table 5 suggest that the presence of a nearby Superfund site did indeed reduce the number
of votes for Trump. Specifically, there were 30.87 million votes for Trump cast in Superfund counties; the (most
conservative) results from the county-level analysis in column (15) suggest that in the absence of Superfund,
Trump would have recieved 31.36 million votes in those counties. Thus, our county-level results imply that
almost 490,000 voters who would have otherwise voted for Trump changed their political affiliation based on
their environmental preferences, at least during the 2016 election. Obviously, this was not a sufficiently large
effect to change the outcome of the election but the order of magnitude is not politically insignificant.
Following our exploration of the relationship between Superfund and Trump’s support at county scale,
in Table 6 we exploit individual voter survey data to examine the extent to which living in a county with a
Superfund site influences the likelihood of a vote for Trump. As with the county-level analysis, to control
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for ‘generic’ party affiliation we include a proxy variable that indicates whether or not the voter supported
Mitt Romney in the 2012 election. We also include a set of standard socio-economic controls, including the
log of household income as well as age, gender, race, and education category. In column (16), we find that,
consistent with the county-level results from Table 4, the presence of one or more Superfund sites significantly
reduces the likelihood that a voter will support Trump. In column (17), we find this effect also follows a ‘dose-
response’ pattern, with two or more Superfund sites reducing the likelihood of supporting for Trump to a larger
extent. In column (18), we additionally control for state fixed effects as well as our set of county-level control
variables that could be correlated with both having a Superfund site and support for Trump, including county-
level median household income, urban share, total population and poverty rate. However, even with the state-
and county-level controls, the coefficient on 2+ Superfunds remains negative and statistically significant.
To explore whether the effect on Trump support from living in a Superfund county is indeed moderated via
attitudes towards the environment, in column (19) of Table 6 we control for whether or not a voter found the
environment to be a ‘Very Important’ issue. As previously discussed, we take care in interpreting this regression
since party affiliation, voter behavior, and environmental attitudes are potentially highly endogenous. Yet, once
environmental attitudes are controlled for, the Superfund variables are no longer statistically significant. The
results from column (19) thus support our interpretation that the relationship between Superfund and Trump
support detected in columns (16)-(18) is driven by variation in environmental attitudes rather than by some
other unobservable omitted variable.
4.2.1 Placebo tests
A potential concern with the results from Table 6 may be that individuals who live in counties with Superfund
sites are just somehow less ‘Republican’ than other counties, for unobservable reasons not captured in our
individual-level, county-level and Romney-2012-vote control variables, and that our results are picking up
these unobservable confounders. To test for this possibility, in columns (20) and (21) of Table 7 we perform a
type of placebo test to explore whether living in a Superfund county equally reduced support for Mitt Romney
in the 2012 Presidential election. Specifically, our theoretical framework predicts that a voter who finds the
environment to be personally salient is less likely to choose a candidate when the candidate’s party platform is
distinctive and clear on the issue. As we have discussed in section 2, the candidacy of Mitt Romney in the 2012
Presidential election was relatively unremarkable in this regard, so in the absence of unobservable confounding
variables correlated with Superfund, we would not expect voters in these counties to be less likely to vote for
him.
Indeed, as expected, in column (20) we find the coefficient estimates on the Superfund dummies are not
statistically significantly different from zero, which is consistent with our interpretation that the pattern of lower
Trump support in Superfund counties is novel and unique to the 2016 election and that the relationship between
Trump support and Superfund is not driven by unobservable confounders. The regression specification in
column (20) is slightly different from those reported in Table 6, however, in that we do not have data on voters’
underlying party preferences. Although we do not have individual voting data from before 2012, we do have
some information on individuals’ Party identification, specifically whether, generally speaking, they think of
themselves as a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or Other. Party identification is not the ideal control for
this experiment - the question was asked between September 28th and November 7th, 2016, on the eve of the
2016 election, and thus may already exclude those voters who had already moved away from the Republican
Party due to dissatisfaction with the Trump campaign. This makes Party identification a weaker control for
“intrinsic initial Republicanness,” (e.g. voters who might be expected to vote the Republican ticket under other
circumstances) than the Romney vote variable in our analysis of the Trump vote. In any event, in column
(21) we run another placebo test, this time also controlling for Republican identification, and find again that
the relationship between Superfund and the Republican vote is still not observed in the 2012 election, which
confirm our results in column (20).
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4.2.2 Instrumental Variables Estimation
So far we have focused on estimating the specific, isolated effect of Superfund sites on voting behavior, and
have shown that the presence of a Superfund site had a non-negligible effect on support for Trump in 2016.
That by itself is interesting and suggests a number of policy implications, although a more general question
we have yet to address is the political order of magnitude of environmental preferences on voter behavior. As
we discussed in sections 1 and 2, most scholars have found environmental preferences to have had little impact
on previous U.S. elections (e.g. Guber, 2001; Leiserowitz, 2006; Repetto, 2006; Hallam and Coffey, 2007);
but, at the same time, the Trump campaign was unique with respect to the divisiveness of its environmental
message. Given the results on Superfund, it is not implausible to speculate that environmental preferences more
generally may have played a much larger role in 2016 than in elections past. However, as we also discussed
in section 2, a considerable literature documents the increasing importance of initial party affiliation in driving
issue preferences, including environmental preferences (e.g. Daniels et al., 2012; Guber, 2013; Ansolabehere
and Puy, 2018). Thus it would be inappropriate to model the vote for Trump as a function of environmental
preferences using OLS, as clearly the regression would suffer from reverse causality.
However, if we accept two key identification assumptions, namely that (a) the distribution of Superfund
sites is exogenous to individual political affiliation, and (b) the mechanism through which Superfund affects
voter choice is only through environmental preferences (e.g. the exclusion restriction), then we can use Super-
fund sites to instrument for environmental preferences, eliminate the channel of reverse causality, and derive
an average causal estimate of the effect of general environmental preferences on voting behavior in the 2016
Presidential election. The key identification assumptions necessary for valid causal inference have already been
discussed in this paper; we have argued that the conditional spatial variation of Superfund is plausibly exoge-
nous, and presented evidence that the mechanism through which Superfund changes a voter’s party affiliation
is via its effect on their environmental preferences, and in particular the personal saliency of environmental
issues.
Table 8 presents the IV estimation of the effect of rating the environment to be a ‘Very Important’ issue (MIP
Environment) on the likelihood of voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential election. We instrument
for MIP Environment using dummy variables for the presence of one, two or more, two to three, four to five,
and five plus Superfund sites in a county. Allowing multiple dummies for Superfund and a flexible form in the
first stage not only generates a better fit, but also has the advantage that we can run over-identification tests of
the exclusion restriction, which in all cases fails to reject the exclusion restriction by a healthy margin.
The results in Table 8 suggest that environmental preferences indeed had a large and significant causal
effect on voting patterns in the 2016 Presidential election. In fact, the coefficient estimates on environmental
preferences are larger in magnitude than age, race, or education level. In columns (22) and (23), we present the
IV estimates with and without State fixed effects; in the latter case (column 23), the coefficient on environmen-
tal preferences is barely significant at the 5% level. Yet, in Democratic ‘blue’ states there may be less variation
in environmental preferences between Superfund and non-Superfund counties, and so, in column (24) we re-
strict the sample to Republican-won states only. The coefficient estimate increases and is again comfortably
statistically significant.
While the IV approach has some real advantages, there are several serious caveats as well. First, while
we can include environmental preferences because we have an instrument, it is impossible to control for other
attitudes and preferences because they are endogenous. So, the observation that the coefficient on environmental
preferences is very large should not be interpreted as meaning that they are more important than other issues -
that is something we do not know. Second, in most of our analysis so far we have argued that the conditional
variation of Superfund is exogenous, and have included voter behavior in the 2012 election as a proxy variable
to control for unobservable dimensions of political affiliation. However, in the case of the IV strategy it would
clearly not be appropriate to control for the Romney vote in 2012 as an explanatory variable in the first-stage
regression, for the same reasons of reverse causality (in reverse) discussed above. Thus, all the results in
Table 8 omit the Romney control, and although we do control for county-level variables and state fixed effects,
the identification assumption that Superfund is exogenous, while still plausible, is arguably weakened. Third, it
13
may be that the “type” of environmental preferences formed from exposure to Superfund have different political
implications than (similarly measured) environmental preferences that have evolved via other mechanisms, and
thus our estimated local average effect may not be representative of the political consequences of increases in
environmental preferences more generally. Last but not least, while in Table 2 we find Superfund to be robustly
and statistically significantly correlated withMIP Environment, the coefficient is small and it is entirely possible
that the economic magnitude of the effect of Superfund may be (relatively) dwarfed by other factors. Indeed,
in Table 8 we observe that the first-stage regression F-statistics are quite small, and never exceed the threshold
of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) as a test for weak instruments. Thus, with weak instruments there
is a real risk that the IV estimates are too large.
Overall, especially in the context of the rest of the analysis presented in this paper, we are comfortable
drawing the conclusion from Table 8 that environmental preferences may have played a much more significant
causal role in the 2016 election than in previous years. However given the caveats outlined above, we are less
committed to the specific point estimates generated by our IV approach.
In sum, despite the documented increasing tendency for party affiliation to determine issue preference rather
than the reverse, consistent with the theoretical prediction that voters for whom the environment is an issue of
personal salience and may have a higher likelihood of changing their voting behavior, both the county- and
individual-level results from Tables 5 and 6 suggest that the presence of a nearby Superfund site did indeed
reduce the number of votes for Trump. Furthermore, the IV analysis in Table 8 suggests that, beyond our
estimates of the isolated impact of Superfund only, in practice environmental preferences more generally could
have had a much more significant effect on voting behaviour in 2016, contrasting with its role as a ‘secondary
issue’ in previous electoral cycles. Given that a change in voter behavior is thus not only possible, but also of
a magnitude that could potentially play a pivotal role, a natural question then arises: what types of voters were
more likely to change their party vote choice on the basis of their personally-salient environmental preferences?
4.3 Heterogeneous effects, Superfund, and environmental salience
Having established a baseline average treatment effect of Superfund on environmental preferences and voting
behavior in section 4.2, we now turn our attention to the question of what types of voters may be more or
less likely to find an exposure to environmental issues, via Superfund, to be of sufficient personal salience
to lead to a change in voting behaviour. In other words, we investigate whether there may be heterogeneous
treatment effects of Superfund. As discussed in section 2 we find three distinct academic literatures - on the
EKC, post-materialism, and environmental voting - that suggest relevant hypotheses with respect to age and
income. While neither the EKC nor the environmental voting literatures make unambiguous predictions about
the effect of age, the post-materialism literature predicts that younger voters may be more strongly effected by
exposure to Superfund. All three literatures suggest that the personal saliency of environmental issues across
individuals within countries may be a function of income, but that the shape of any relationship is ex ante
theoretically ambiguous.
4.3.1 Heterogeneous effects and age cohort
As discussed in section 2, research on post-materialism suggests that, within countries, age cohort is the best
predictor of post-materialist values, including stronger environmental preferences. And indeed, in Table 2, we
do in fact find that voters under 30 years of age are statistically significantly more likely to find the environment
to be a ‘Very Important’ issue. A natural extension of this claim is that, when confronted with challenging
environmental information such as that embodied in a nearby Superfund site, younger voters may find this
information particularly personally salient, and thus be more likely to change their voting behavior as a result.
In Table 9, we test whether younger voters (under age 30) display a stronger response to being exposed to a
superfund site, and/or if this translates into a greater likelihood of changing voting behavior. Column (25) of
Table 9 shows whether the effect of a Superfund on survey respondents’ likelihood of rating the environment
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as a ‘Very Important’ issue is greater for respondents under 30 years of age. We do so by controlling for the
interaction of Superfund with a dummy for age under 30 years (Age≤30), in addition to our set of individual
control characteristics. While the coefficient on Superfund is positive and highly significant, the interaction of
Superfund with Age≤30 is not statistically significant. In column (26), we additionally include county-level
controls and state fixed effects, but still the interaction term is not statistically significant. Thus, although
younger people are indeed more likely to have stronger environmental preferences generally, when exposed
to information and publicity about environmental hazards associated with Superfund sites, their concern does
not increase more than the population as a whole. In other words, we find no evidence of heterogeneous
post-materialist saliency effects of Superfund sites.
Although we find no evidence of heterogeneous effects of age cohort in terms of the importance of the
environment as an issue, in Table 9 columns (27) and (28) we explore whether we might still nevertheless
observe post-materialist heterogenous effects in political behavior. Specifically, in column (27) we look at both
Superfund and the interaction of Superfund and Age≤30 in explaining the likelihood of voting for Trump in
the 2016 Presidential election, controlling for the full set of individual and county-level variables and state
fixed effects. However, again, we find the interaction term is small and not statistically significant. As in Table
6, we find two or more Superfund sites to have the largest effect on the likelihood for voting for Trump; in
column (28), we similarly look for an effect of the interaction of Age≤30 with 2+ Superfunds, but again, find
no evidence of any heterogeneous effects associated with age cohort.
4.3.2 Heterogeneous effects and household income
Both the EKC and environmental voting literatures suggest a number of possible mechanisms through which
income, both at the household- and aggregate-level, could play a role in the generation of environmental prefer-
ences and political affiliation. To investigate whether Superfund could have heterogeneous effects by income,
in Table 10 we use the individual survey data to explore the relationship between Superfund with both environ-
mental attitudes and voting behavior in the 2016 election by income cohort.
Specifically, we divide individuals and counties into three broad income categories each. We categorize
counties according to whether county-level median household income is low (≤ $40,000) or high (≥ $70,000),
and individuals according to whether household income is low (≤ $30,000) or high (≥ $80,000). Thus, the
omitted reference category in each is ‘medium’, which corresponds to a median household income of between
$40-70,000 at the county level, or a household income of between $30-80,000 at the individual level. We then
interact these income category dummies with our Superfund variables. In columns (29) and (30), we model
environmental attitudes and interact the income categories with one or more Superfund sites (‘1 Superfund’),
and in columns (31) and (32) we model whether the respondent voted for Trump and interact the income
categories with two or more Superfund sites (‘2+ Superfunds’). The latter is the variable we found most
robustly significant in the earlier analysis. In all cases we control for the full set of individual socio-demographic
variables (not reported to save space), and each case we present two regressions, with and without the state fixed
effects and county-level controls.
In Table 10 columns (29) and (30), we find that respondents from lower-income households and/or from
counties with higher median household incomes are more likely to rate the environment as a ‘Very Impor-
tant’ issue. Living in a more affluent area may increase the chance someone is exposed to pro-environmental
messages, but having a personally low income may increase personal vulnerability to environmental issues.
However, when we interact the income categories with Superfund, we find that living in a county with one
or more Superfund sites statistically significantly increases concern for the environment beyond the baseline
increase (associated with ‘medium’ income categories), only in counties with low median household income.
Thus, overall, we find concern for the environment increases across households from all income levels in coun-
ties with one or more Superfund sites, and this general increase in concern will be even higher still if the
county’s median household income is relatively low.
In Table 10 columns (31) and (32), we turn our attention to voting behavior and find that none of the income
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category dummies are by themselves statistically significant given that we are controlling for whether or not a
voter voted for Romney in 2012, which will capture most if not all of the Republican-income relationship. Yet,
when we interact the income categories with 2+ Superfunds, we find that it is individuals with low individual
household incomes who are less likely to vote for Trump. We parse this out further in column (33), separating
out five different low-to-medium income categories and again interacting these category dummies with 2+
Superfunds. The results suggest that the anti-Trump effect of Superfund sites is strongest (and most statistically
significant) among households with incomes in the $20-30,000 range, just at the high end of the ’Low’ category
used in columns (29)-(32).
The individual survey results presented in Table 10 are interesting and provocative, suggesting that while a
Superfund site increases widespread concern for the environment generally, it is primarily moderately low (but
not too low)-income voters who are most likely to change their voter behavior in response to their concerns
about the environment. Individuals from households below or just above the poverty line are less likely to
vote for Trump, but this effect is not statistically significantly different from the overall (also negative) average
effect. Individuals from households earning more than $40,000 are also no less likely than the average to vote
for Trump. However, individuals from households that earn sufficiently to keep them above the poverty line
but not enough for them to feel economically secure (i.e. between $20-30,000) display a strong, statistically
significant drop in their support for Trump (even controlling for whether or not they voted for Romney in the
2012 election) in counties where there are two or more Superfund sites (the effect is similar for ’one or more
Superfund sites’ but not quite as large; not reported but available on request).
In Table 11, we further explore the relationship between Superfund sites, voter behavior, and income, but
at the county level. In particular, in column (34) we continue to include the full set of county-level control
variables and state fixed effects (not reported to save space but available upon request), but now introduce an
interaction term between Superfund and median household income. For the full sample, while the coefficient
estimate on the interaction term is negative, it is not statistically significant.
However, as we discussed in section 2, research has shown that political orientation is associated with atti-
tudes towards the environment, with Democrats more likely than Republicans to support a pro-environmental
policy platform (Liu et al., 2014; Booth, 2017; Eun Kim and Urpelainen, 2018). If voters across all income
groups in predominantly Democratic counties already view the environment as important, and already view
Trump as undesirable for myriad other reasons, then the additional presence of a Superfund site may not result
in any change in voting behavior; after all, you can only vote against Trump once per election. In order to test
whether personal salience for the environment, as a reason to change party vote choice, may be more relevant
in more Republican-leaning areas, in column (35) we restrict the sample to states won by Trump in 2016. In the
Republican state-only sample, we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction of
Superfund and household median income. Specifically, as median household income is measured in thousands-
of-dollars, the coefficient on Superfund is .04 and the coefficient on the interaction term is -0.001, the results
from column (35) suggests that the turning point is a household median income of $40,000. Then, for every
$10,000 increase in household median income, the presence of at least one superfund site reduces the expected
Trump vote by 1%.
From Table 11 column (35) alone, we cannot tell from our aggregate (or ‘ecological’) data which income
group is most important for the results, but the individual-level results from Table 10 suggest that it is primarily
lower-income individuals with household income of between $20-30,000 who are primarily shifting their votes
away from the Republican Party. To investigate which income cohort of voters are driving the results in column
(35), in columns (36) and (37) we relax the linear assumption on the functional form of the interaction of
specification (34) and instead substitute our continuous variable of median household income with the shares of
households in different income brackets (including both level and interaction with Superfund). Specifically, we
consider how support for Trump will change when the share of households earning less than $30,000 increases
(in other words, median county income falls due to increased low-income share), and how it changes when the
share of households earning more than $150,000 increases (in other words, median county income increases
due to increases in high-income share), with the omitted (very broad) reference category being households
earning between $30-150,000.
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In column (36), we find that the baseline effect of Superfund is negative and statistically significant, while
the coefficient on the share of households with incomes below $30,000 and the associated interaction with
Superfund is positive and statistically significant. In other words, as the proportion of lower-income households
falls, the expected vote for Trump falls and this decrease is even greater (more than doubled) when there is a
Superfund in the county. Thus, an increase in median household income, which is the result of a having a
smaller share of households with lower incomes, may explain the observed county-level pattern. In column
(37), we explore the opposite, i.e. what happens if the share of higher-income households (with incomes over
$150,000) is higher? In this case, the interaction with Superfund is also positive, but the coefficient estimate is
extremely small (0.00000146 to be precise) and significant only at 5%. We conclude that the effect on voting
from changes in the share of top income households is unlikely to differ much from the (significant) baseline
effect, and that the estimated heterogeneous effects of county-level median income on Superfund’s effect on
voting behavior from column (35) is primarily driven from below rather than above the median.
Taken together, the individual- and county-level results from Tables 10 and 11 suggest that the effect of
Superfund on support for Trump grows as household income increases from well below the poverty line to
moderately low levels of around $30,000, and then tapers off and begins to decline after household income
passes about $40,000.
5 Discussion
Overall, the results tell a compelling story about the interaction of issue saliency and voter preferences. The
combination of Donald Trump’s Presidential campaign in 2016 and Superfund provides an interesting ‘natural
experiment’ which enables us to test the hypothesis that it takes both a significant difference between the par-
ties’ environmental policy platforms, and personal voter salience with respect to environmental issues, to effect
a change in voter behaviour. A big advantage of this approach is that we are able to make stronger statements
about causal effects: Trump’s environmental position generates exogenous variation in the former, while the
EPA’s Superfund program generates exogenous variation in the latter. The nearby presence of a Superfund
site raises environmental awareness and concern, with more individuals across all income categories rating the
environment as a ‘Very Important’ issue and expressing support for policies that enforce clean air and water
standards, even at the expense of jobs. At the county level, we observe that having a Superfund site also lowers
the expected vote for Trump in a striking ‘dose-response’ pattern. This relationship is mirrored in the individual
survey data; controlling for a host of socio-economic controls as well as voting behavior in the 2012 Presiden-
tial election, the presence of one or more Superfund sites (and especially two or more Superfund sites) lowers
the likelihood an individual will vote for Trump. This pattern does not seem to be related to unobservables
correlated with party affiliation, for the effect does not show up in the (less environmentally divergent) 2012
election, nor does it appear when we explore alternative but traditionally partisan issues. However, the mecha-
nism does appear to be connected to concern for the environment since the importance of Superfund disappears
when we control for whether or not an individual finds the environment to be a “Very Important” issue.
Trump’s campaign platform on the environment also emphasized a downsizing in the role of the EPA as the
country’s predominant environmental regulator (e.g. Hejny, 2018). This suggests an alternative hypothesis that
it is actually increased support for the EPA and the Superfund program itself, not environmental preferences per
se, that are driving our results (and could violate the exclusion restriction of the IV analysis in section 4.2.2).
These two interpretations are naturally related, and might tell the same story in terms of issue salience and
party platform. Yet, the issues are slightly different in that the Superfund program could simply be viewed as
an example of effective government, which might challenge some conservative voters’ views on the desirability
of ‘small government’. One way to test for this would be to test the degree to which Superfund plays a role in
either individuals’ personal support for the EPA, or the degree to which they find government to be effective, but
unfortunately no questions in the CCESS16 survey were appropriate for this exercise so we leave this question
for future research.
Our quantitative estimates suggest that, on the basis of their environmental preferences, up to half-a-million
17
voters across the U.S. switched their party affiliation away from the Republicans in the 2016 Presidential elec-
tion. Although younger voters’ baseline concern for the environment is greater, we find no evidence that they
respond more strongly to the presence of a Superfund site than older voters. This result therefore provides
little, if any, support for the post-materialism hypothesis on age cohorts. We do, however, find a non-linear
interaction with Superfund and household income, which suggests that the effect of a Superfund site on voting
behavior increases as household income increases along the low end of the income distribution, but then tapers
off and declines as household income increases above $40,000 or so. This figure is consistent with the results
from previous research on the demand for environmental regulation (e.g. Kahn and Matsuaka, 1997; Kahn,
2002; Wu and Cutter, 2011), yet in these previous studies the extent of support for a particular environmental
regulation or initiative may be confounded by preferences for other issues such as redistribution, unlike our
“cleaner” measure of concern for the environment.
In conclusion, we find that Superfund sites increase the political salience of the environment as a voting
issue, and that this effect changes voting behavior, at least some cases, and is particularly strong for households
’just getting by.’ Importantly, these moderately low-income voters belong precisely to the income group that is
also most likely to vote for Trump (e.g. Rothwell and Diego-Rosell, 2016), which suggests that educational and
informational campaigns aimed at lower-income households to increase the personal saliency of environmental
issues could potentially have disproportionately large political effects. Such campaigns might be effective in
some counties with relatively large Republican-leaning voters, but where the Superfund program is presently
absent, and could potentially make a difference in tight races between candidates with divergent views on policy
towards the environment. Finally, while our data does not allow us to explore whether these shorter-run changes
in voters’ party choice might lead to longer-run changes in deeper political affiliation, they surely constitute a
first step along that journey, and we leave it to future research to shed more light on this question.
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6 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max
County-Level Data
Trump 2016 % 2711 0.64 0.16 0.08 0.95
Romney 2012 % 2711 0.61 0.15 0.06 0.97
Superfund 2711 0.26 0.44 0 1
Superfund sites 704 2.28 2.67 1 23
NPL 2711 0.21 0.40 0 1
NPL sites 560 2.08 2.35 1 23
Median HH Income (000) 2710 48.64 12.10 22.89 125.90
Poverty rate 2710 15.99 6.21 3.40 47.40
Voter participation rate 2710 0.45 0.08 0.13 0.81
White share of pop. 2711 79.93 19.52 2.80 99.20
Black share of pop. 2711 7.57 13.36 0 85.70
Hispanic share of pop. 2711 8.20 13.67 0 95.70
Asian share of pop 2711 1.12 2.44 0 43.90
Population 2710 9.75 33.38 0.01 1003.47
Urban share 2710 0.69 0.40 0 1
Share age≥ 50yrs 2711 0.37 0.06 0.14 0.61
Share age≤25yrs 2711 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.49
China shock 2671 3.65 4.79 -0.77 65.55
Unemployment rate 2711 6.84 3.14 0 36.10
Male LFPR 2711 0.67 0.09 0.18 1
Manufacturing share 2681 0.14 0.13 0 1
Mining share 2681 0.02 0.06 0 0.78
CCESS16 Individual Voter-Level Data
Voted for Trump 29515 0.40 0.49 0 1
Voted for Romney 29515 0.39 0.49 0 1
Republican Identification 29514 0.28 0.45 0 1
MIP Environment 9014 0.37 0.48 0 1
MIP Gun Control 9003 0.47 0.50 0 1
MIP Gay Marriage 9013 0.17 0.38 0 1
MIP Gov. Deficit 9014 0.41 0.49 0 1
Clean Air & Water 39540 0.58 0.49 0 1
HH income 29515 76,260 60,641 5,000 500,000
Age≤30 29515 0.08 0.27 0 1
Age≥55 29515 0.48 0.50 0 1
Male 29515 0.47 0.50 0 1
White 29515 0.78 0.41 0 1
Black 29515 0.09 0.29 0 1
Hispanic 29515 0.06 0.23 0 1
Educ≤HS 29515 0.22 0.41 0 1
Educ≥Univ. 29515 0.43 0.49 0 1
22
Table 2: MIP is the Environment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MIP MIP MIP MIP MIP
Environment Environment Environment Environment Environment
Superfund 0.059∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.029∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.024)
1 Superfund 0.029
(0.083)
2+ Superfunds 0.029
(0.051)
Voted for Romney -0.460∗∗∗
in 2012 (0.000)
Log HH income -0.045∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
(individual-level) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HH median income 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(county-level) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age≤30 0.075∗∗ 0.040 0.070∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.068∗∗
(0.002) (0.173) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Age≥55 0.033∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010)
Male -0.075∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
White 0.006 0.027 0.016 0.020 0.020
(0.755) (0.180) (0.422) (0.320) (0.320)
Black 0.069∗∗ -0.090∗∗ 0.064∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.075∗∗
(0.006) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003)
Hispanic 0.036 -0.006 0.026 0.029 0.029
(0.296) (0.883) (0.447) (0.411) (0.412)
Educ≤HS -0.040∗∗ -0.029∗ -0.036∗ -0.034∗ -0.034∗
(0.006) (0.046) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
Educ≥University 0.082∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Poverty Rate 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(county-level) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Urban share 0.031 0.012 0.012
(county-level) (0.404) (0.743) (0.743)
Total population 0.000 0.000 0.000
(county-level) (0.069) (0.078) (0.098)
State fixed effects N N N Y Y
N 9014 7768 9014 9014 9014
R2 0.025 0.230 0.029 0.038 0.038
robust p-values clustered at county level in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3: Other Issues and Superfund
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Gun Gay Government Clean
Control Marriage Deficit Air & Water
Superfund 0.008 0.002 -0.011 0.018∗
(0.484) (0.845) (0.420) (0.026)
Log(HH income) 0.007 -0.008 -0.002 -0.023∗∗∗
(individual) (0.314) (0.138) (0.790) (0.000)
HH median income 0.002∗ 0.000 -0.002∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(county-level) (0.012) (0.475) (0.024) (0.000)
Age≤30 -0.021 0.055∗ -0.108∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.365) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000)
Age≥55 0.089∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.087∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
White 0.013 0.038∗ -0.071∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗
(0.584) (0.020) (0.002) (0.000)
Black 0.212∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.062∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.935) (0.047) (0.000)
Hispanic 0.083∗ 0.015 -0.030 0.021
(0.014) (0.578) (0.401) (0.122)
Educ≤HS 0.015 -0.001 0.021 -0.049∗∗∗
(0.327) (0.957) (0.151) (0.000)
Educ≥University 0.016 0.016 -0.072∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.071) (0.000) (0.000)
Poverty rate 0.004∗ 0.001 -0.003 0.008∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.518) (0.109) (0.000)
Urban share 0.026 0.011 -0.017 0.042∗
(0.486) (0.699) (0.662) (0.043)
Total population 0.000∗ 0.000∗ -0.000 0.000∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.048) (0.146) (0.000)
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y
N 9003 9014 9013 39540
R2 0.037 0.032 0.014 0.049
p-values in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
robust p-values clustered at county level in parentheses
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Table 4: Trump share of 2016 vote and Superfund sites
(10) (11) (12)
Trump % Trump % Trump %
Romney 2012 % 0.970∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Superfund -0.024∗∗∗
(0.000)
1 Superfund site -0.014∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
2+ Superfund sites -0.039∗∗∗
(0.000)
2-4 Superfund sites -0.034∗∗∗
(0.000)
5+ Superfund sites -0.058∗∗∗
(0.000)
constant 0.057∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.061∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
N 2710 2710 2710
R2 0.892 0.893 0.894
Robust p-values clustered at state level in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5: Trump share of 2016 vote and Superfund sites, more controls
(13) (14) (15)
Trump % Trump % Trump %
Romney 2012 % 0.843∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Superfund -0.011∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.006∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008)
HH Median Income -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Poverty rate -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.611) (0.055) (0.087)
White share of population 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
Black share of population -0.000∗ -0.001∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.041) (0.000)
Hispanic share of population -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.370) (0.329) (0.127)
Asian share of population -0.002 -0.004∗ -0.002
(0.117) (0.011) (0.173)
Total Population -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.079) (0.099) (0.083)
Urban share -0.011∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.000) (0.000)
Share age≥50yrs -0.150∗ -0.170∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.002) (0.000)
Share age≤25yrs -0.470∗∗∗ -0.443∗∗∗ -0.454∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
China shock -0.000 -0.000
(0.287) (0.285)
Unemployment rate 0.001 0.002∗∗
(0.175) (0.001)
Male LFPR -0.084∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Manufacturing share 0.043∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Mining share 0.073∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
constant 0.275∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
State fixed effects N N Y
N 2709 2642 2642
R2 0.944 0.947 0.967
Robust p-values clustered at state level in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6: Individual Survey Data
(16) (17) (18) (19)
Voted for Trump Voted for Trump Voted for Trump Voted for Trump
in 2016 in 2016 in 2016 in 2016
Superfund -0.017∗∗
(0.003)
1 Superfund -0.008 -0.004 -0.000
(0.258) (0.516) (0.986)
2+ Superfunds -0.020∗∗ -0.015∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.029) (0.892)
Voted for Romney 0.712∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗
in 2012 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MIP Environment -0.121∗∗∗
(0.000)
Log(HH income) -0.003 -0.003 -0.000 -0.016∗∗
(individual) (0.262) (0.307) (0.916) (0.001)
HH median income -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(county-level) (0.000) (0.000)
Age≤30 -0.064∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age≥55 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.017∗
(0.722) (0.734) (0.831) (0.024)
Male 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.457)
White 0.017∗ 0.016∗ 0.014 -0.033
(0.044) (0.049) (0.117) (0.075)
Black -0.082∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hispanic -0.021 -0.021 -0.024 -0.059
(0.120) (0.127) (0.073) (0.056)
Educ≤HS 0.041∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.439)
Educ≥University -0.066∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Poverty rate -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(county-level) (0.000) (0.005)
Urban share -0.057∗∗∗ -0.010
(county-level) (0.001) (0.699)
Total population 0.000 -0.000
(county-level) (0.104) (0.628)
State fixed effects N N Y Y
N 29515 29515 29515 7543
R2 0.562 0.562 0.565 0.654
robust p-values clustered at county level in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 7: Individual Survey Data: Placebo Tests
(20) (21)
Voted for Romney Voted for Romney
in 2012 in 2012
1 Superfund -0.011 -0.001
(0.354) (0.899)
2+ Superfunds -0.010 -0.000
(0.391) (0.981)
Republican 0.625∗∗∗
(0.000)
Log(HH income) 0.045∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(Individual) (0.000) (0.000)
HH median income -0.004∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(County-level) (0.000) (0.000)
Age≤30 -0.078∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Age≥55 0.064∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.056∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
White 0.052∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.000) (0.526)
Black -0.323∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Hispanic -0.101∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Educ≤HS 0.039∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.000) (0.177)
Educ≥University -0.090∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
County-level controls Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y
N 29515 29514
R2 0.114 0.420
County-level controls: Poverty Rate, Urban Share, Total Population.
Robust p-values clustered at county level in parentheses.
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 8: Individual Survey Data: Instrumental Variables Estimation
(22) (23) (24)
Voted for Trump Voted for Trump Voted for Trump
in 2016 in 2016 in 2016
Sample: All All Republican
States States States
MIP Environment -0.747∗∗ -0.589 -0.863∗
(0.002) (0.055) (0.020)
Log(HH income) -0.011 -0.006 -0.011
(individual-level) (0.408) (0.695) (0.498)
HH median income -0.001 -0.003∗ -0.002
(county-level) (0.116) (0.017) (0.137)
Age≤30 -0.100∗∗ -0.114∗∗ -0.124∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Age≥55 0.062∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Male 0.029 0.041 0.013
(0.183) (0.119) (0.678)
White -0.007 -0.008 -0.026
(0.741) (0.693) (0.454)
Black -0.311∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hispanic -0.093∗ -0.108∗∗ -0.087
(0.019) (0.006) (0.225)
Educ≤HS 0.019 0.024 0.004
(0.303) (0.201) (0.870)
Educ≥University -0.092∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Poverty rate -0.002 -0.006 -0.004
(county-level) (0.568) (0.072) (0.350)
Urban share 0.022 0.000 0.010
(county-level) (0.609) (0.993) (0.844)
Total population -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(county-level) (0.401) (0.125) (0.458)
State Fixed Effects N Y Y
N 8130 8130 4341
1st-Stage F − Stat 3.17 1.7 1.5
Over-ID p− value 0.92 0.48 0.93
robust p-values in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Instruments: 1 Superfund, 2+ Superfunds, 2-3 Superfunds, 4-5 Superfunds, 5+ Superfunds
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Table 9: Testing for Heterogeneous Effects: Age cohort with Individual Survey Data
(25) (26) (27) (28)
MIP MIP Voted for Trump Voted for Trump
Environment Environment in 2016 in 2016
Superfund 0.057∗∗∗ 0.026 -0.011
(0.000) (0.054) (0.070)
1 Superfund -0.004
(0.520)
2+ Superfunds -0.014∗
(0.036)
Superfund* 0.052 0.062 -0.001
Age≤30 (0.302) (0.203) (0.936)
2+ Superfund* -0.007
Age≤30 (0.649)
Voted for Romney 0.709∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗
in 2012 (0.000) (0.000)
Log(HH income) -0.044∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
(individual) (0.000) (0.000) (0.895) (0.913)
Age≤30 0.038 0.024 -0.062∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗
(0.367) (0.560) (0.000) (0.000)
Age≥55 0.033∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.009) (0.830) (0.831)
Male -0.075∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
White 0.007 0.021 0.014 0.014
(0.740) (0.308) (0.117) (0.118)
Black 0.070∗∗ 0.076∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Hispanic 0.037 0.030 -0.024 -0.024
(0.284) (0.398) (0.072) (0.073)
Educ≤HS -0.040∗∗ -0.034∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000)
Educ≥University 0.082∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
County-Level Controls N Y Y Y
State fixed effects N Y Y Y
N 9014 9014 29515 29515
R2 0.025 0.039 0.565 0.565
County-level controls: HH Median income, Poverty Rate, Urban Share, Total Population.
Robust p-values clustered at county level in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 10: Testing for Heterogeneous Effects: Income Cohort with Individual Survey Data
(29) (30) (31) (32) (33)
MIP MIP Voted for Trump Voted for Trump Voted for Trump
Environment Environment in 2016 in 2016 in 2016
Superfund 0.060∗∗∗ 0.039∗
(0.001) (0.039)
1 Superfund -0.008 -0.002 -0.000
(0.265) (0.821) (0.981)
2+ Superfunds -0.014 -0.013 -0.010
(0.060) (0.095) (0.205)
Low (indiv.) HH income* -0.029 -0.035 -0.026∗ -0.024∗
Superfund(s) (0.298) (0.208) (0.013) (0.024)
high (indiv.) HH income* 0.009 0.001 0.007 0.005
Superfund(s) (0.710) (0.962) (0.412) (0.523)
Low Median HH inc* 0.129∗ 0.121 0.029 0.045
Superfund(s) (0.048) (0.051) (0.406) (0.183)
High Median HH inc* -0.048 -0.051 -0.004 0.001
Superfund(s) (0.163) (0.101) (0.762) (0.940)
HH income ≤$10K* -0.042
2+ Superfunds (0.102)
HH income $10-20K* -0.009
2+ Superfunds (0.581)
HH income $20-30K* -0.035∗
2+ Superfunds (0.014)
HH income $30-40K* -0.017
2+ Superfunds (0.229)
HH income $40-50K* 0.000
2+ Superfunds (0.970)
romney2012 0.711∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Low HH income 0.081∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.007 0.006
(individual) (0.000) (0.000) (0.342) (0.385)
High HH income -0.049∗ -0.048∗ -0.007 -0.006
(individual) (0.012) (0.013) (0.267) (0.336)
Low Median HH income -0.069∗∗ -0.049 0.015 0.009
(county-level) (0.007) (0.085) (0.132) (0.417)
High Median HH income 0.063∗ 0.051 -0.015 -0.016
(county-level) (0.020) (0.056) (0.208) (0.134)
State fixed effects N Y N Y Y
County-level controls N Y N Y Y
N 9014 9014 29515 29515 29515
R2 0.026 0.037 0.563 0.564 0.564
County-level controls: Urban Share, Total Population, HH income category dummies (column 32).
Also included but not displayed: Age≤30, Age≥55, Male, White, Black, Hispanic, Educ≤HS,≥University
Robust p-values clustered at county level in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 11: Testing for Heterogeneous Effects: Income Cohort with County-Level Data
(34) (35) (36) (37)
Trump % Trump % Trump % Trump %
Sample: All Republican Republican Republican
States States States States
Romney 2012 % 0.868∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Superfund 0.005 0.040∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗
(0.580) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
HH Median Income -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
HH Median Income* -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗
Superfund (0.221) (0.000)
Share of HHs w/income≤30K 0.103∗∗∗
(0.000)
Share of HHs w/income≤30K* 0.141∗∗∗
Superfund (0.000)
Share of HHs w/income≥150K -0.000
(0.114)
Share of HHs w/income≥150K* 0.000∗
Superfund (0.031)
Poverty rate -0.001 -0.001 0.001∗
(0.093) (0.117) (0.033)
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y
N 2642 1972 1972 1972
R2 0.967 0.964 0.962 0.960
Included but not displayed: white, black, Hispanic, and Asian share of population, Total population,
Urban share, Shares age ≤25 and ≥50 yrs, China shock, Unemployment rate, Male LFPR,
Manufacturing share, Mining share.
Note: Robust p-values clustered at state level in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
